

TRAINING THE WAY WE FIGHT ... ARE TACTICAL UNITS PREPARED FOR POST CONFLICT OPERATIONS?

A Monograph
By
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Infantry



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
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
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
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ABSTRACT

TRAINING THE WAY WE FIGHT OR FOR THE FIGHT . . . ARE TACTICAL UNITS PREPARED FOR POST CONFLICT OPERATIONS? By MAJ John M. Metz, USA, 57 pages.

This monograph examines the role of maneuver brigades in post conflict operations. Tactical combat units are increasingly expected to support both the combat as well as the post conflict phase of contingency operations. With limited resources, most brigades cannot manage to train to their METL much less post conflict tasks. Four case studies illustrate tactical unit performance in post conflict operations. Each case study is assessed in terms of four criteria: preparatory training, force tailoring, rules of engagement, and transition operations.

A review of current and future post conflict doctrine establishes a foundation for developing criteria and assessing case studies. Most discussion concerning post conflict operations occurs in the joint and operational level army literature. Not until the recent publication of the U.S. Army's Field Manual 7-30, does any tactical level doctrinal literature address post conflict. Four case studies (Operations POWER PACK, JUST CAUSE, PROVIDE COMFORT, and UPHOLD DEMOCRACY) offer illustrations of tactical combat units performing post conflict operations. The first two studies show what usually happens to units that assume post conflict tasks with little or no preparation. The second two contrast the first two by illustrating what units can accomplish when given advance warning of an impending post conflict mission.

The monograph's final section offers conclusions and recommendations for commanders and operations officers. An analysis of each case study is given with respect to the tactical unit leaders ability to learn, anticipate, and adapt to these complex situations. The four evaluation criteria provide the basis for recommendations that commanders and staff officers can use when preparing units for possible post conflict missions.

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INTRODUCTION

The environmental states in which military operations exist range from peacetime to conflict to war.¹ To a combat brigade commander, these environments translate to combat and noncombat operations or as war and operations other than war. A phenomenon not new to combat units, but that U.S. Army doctrine is just now addressing relates to those nascent tactical level post conflict tasks. This period of conflict termination and stability operations involves tactical units who expectantly or unknowingly must now execute these complex tasks.

Today's force projection doctrine insists that both light and armored forces maintain an unprecedented high level of preparedness. This rapid deployment ethos, coupled with scarce defense funding, dictates a concentrated training agenda on only those doctrinal mission essential combat tasks. Hence, brigades and battalions receive little, if any, exposure to the post conflict environment. The dilemma facing these commanders is how to maintain combat readiness while adjusting unit perception to meet the post conflict operational complexities.

This monograph analyzes how United States based contingency force combat brigades perform post conflict operations. It is not meant to be didactic. What it does is present relevant issues and ideas, illustrated by contemporary case studies, which spawn conclusions and recommendations for brigade commanders and operations officers tasked to execute post conflict operations. Besides combat, brigade's are employed to restore order, reduce confusion, and when required assist other support forces in repairing infrastructure while continuing to prepare for redeployment. This may include humanitarian efforts, disaster relief, population control, and other activities.² One

constant associated with post conflict operations is their unpredictability. Often an anachronism exists when discussing post conflict operations. Units are often required to accomplish post conflict tasks while combat operations are still occurring within and outside the brigade's area of operations.³ By analyzing the brigade organization and training, how rules of engagement affect its missions, and how prepared brigades transition responsibilities, one sees that tactical combat brigades are both the least prepared and most asked for instrument for post conflict operations.

The study is organized into three subsequent sections. The second section involves a doctrinal literature review. This review examines current and future U.S. Army and joint post conflict doctrine. The "primary" doctrinal materials involved interagency, joint, and U.S. Army published and draft documents. Appendix A covers the key terminology are not addressed here.

Case study presentations comprise the monograph's third section. Operations POWER PACK, JUST CAUSE, and PROVIDE COMFORT, and UPHOLD DEMOCRACY illustrate the complicated missions facing tactical units. The first two cases exemplify the norm where contingency forces deploy and find themselves confronted with missions and situations in which they must reorient their mental and physical models. The last two are contrasting, in that they show how, with time and an understanding of the mission, U.S. Army tactical combat units can prepare for and successfully support post conflict operations.

The final section offers conclusions and recommendations for commanders and staffs. The study's criteria (training, organization,

ROE, and transition operations) offer a framework from which the conclusions and recommendations originate.

A brigade's post conflict mission requirements may encompass a broad spectrum of tasks. Part of the difficulty in studying this operational environment is limiting the scope to a few critical areas. These areas must be general enough to incorporate a large segment of post conflict missions, but narrow enough to articulate them succinctly. The four areas I chose to evaluate the case studies and formulate my conclusions around involve preparatory training, force structure, rules of engagement and transition operations.

Training on post conflict tasks is currently receiving the attention of the U.S. Army's leadership. Most problems arising in this area relate to the resource questions of funding and time. The misperception held by many leaders is that they cannot afford post conflict training activities. This often results in an individual and collective misunderstanding of post conflict mission requirements. As the commander of 2d Brigade, 10th Mountain Division in Haiti, Colonel James Dubik realized that most post conflict training requirements are at the senior company grade and field grade levels. His use of professional development programs and subject matter experts prepared his Brigade for its post conflict mission.⁴ As an evaluation tool, I want to determine what training, if any, units conduct prior to and during the deployment and the benefits this training had on both the soldiers and the organization.

With this emphasis on force projection and joint operations, comes force structure and capabilities questions. The U.S. Army can no longer afford to differentiate between contingency and main battle forces.

Therefore, all combat brigades are now vulnerable to a no-notice deployment posture. This has definite implications for the combat brigade design. U.S. Army doctrine now expects brigades to establish the foundation for building a task force or ARFOR. Questions arise as to what missions brigades are capable of accomplishing. These questions affect tailoring and force design. Force tailoring, as a criteria, offers a look at the flexibility of the brigade organization, and second it identifies the planning considerations (METT-T) that affect tactical configurations.

In peace and war, rules of engagement (ROE) govern all military operations. ROE not only come from strategic and operational guidelines, but are also derived from the Laws of Land Warfare and international agreements.⁵ ROE should reflect the operational environment. The amorphous environment in which post conflict operations emanate is full of pitfalls and blind alleys that can cybernetically, physically, and morally destroy untrained units. Planners and commanders must understand the evolution of these rules from a combat to post conflict operations, as well as the impact of international law on tactical commanders. This study includes examples where the ROE successfully and unsuccessfully evolved to reflect the operational environment. Flexible and realistic rules of engagement enhance organizational legitimacy and trust between the tactical unit and the population.

Transition planning is the final category used to analyze post conflict operations. Most contingency operations do not call for a sustained military presence. As a result, national reconstruction is often delegated to international and non-governmental organizations

(NGO). Tactical unit commanders facilitate the transition of post conflict activities. Understanding of who the players are and their role in the process is essential. Each case offers differing methods for transition planning. In an area as nebulous as NGO coordination, the key is to understand how they operate and what the military must, can, will, and can not do to assist in the transition effort. Joint and U.S. Army doctrine just recently began introducing the services to the ubiquitous interagency environment. The next section introduces the current and future post conflict doctrinal trends.

DOCTRINAL ASSESSMENT

The responsibility for post conflict operations guidance lies with our strategic policy makers and their stated objectives.⁶ In the absence of clear guidance, a brigade commander's initial actions may constitute the only succinct plan developed to restore order within a war ravaged region. Rarely, will the resources exist likened to Operation ECLIPSE where a national post conflict strategy resulted from a thorough planning effort begun several years prior to the World War II's end.⁷ However, in today's age of rapidly deploying, force projection combat units, this is rarely the case. The root cause of this planning "Achilles heel" is the lack of doctrine which often begets incoherent conflict termination strategies.⁸

By surveying current and proposed post conflict doctrine, this study examines where it helps, defeats, or is indifferent to the maneuver brigade commander's mission. This assessment starts with the joint literature and ends by analyzing the brigade level publications. At each level, the discussion returns to the doctrinal issues pertaining

to training, organization, rules of engagement and transition operations. The joint doctrine pertaining to post conflict operations is located primarily in Joint Publication 3-0, Doctrine for Joint Operations, Joint Test Publication 3-57, Doctrine for Joint Civil Affairs Operations, and Joint Publication 5-0, Doctrine for Planning Joint Operations and the Joint Warfighting Centers "Joint Task Force Commanders Handbook." Joint Publication 3-0 describes post conflict operations as,

existing from the immediate end of the conflict to a redeployment of the last US service member. A variety of operations other than war occur during this period. These operations involve all instruments of national power and include those actions that ensure political objectives are achieved and sustained.⁹

This explanation demonstrates the holistic manner commanders and planners anticipate and prepare for conflict termination and post conflict mission requirements. Joint doctrine, which is oriented toward the unified commands and joint task forces, stresses that an analysis and incorporation of strategic and operational objectives must occur as part of conflict resolution and post conflict strategies.¹⁰ Even though tactical units at a much lower level, brigade's experience similar planning demands. As seen in Somalia, tactical operations set in explosive environments can incur strategic consequences. A joint asset that can help bridge the gap between tactical operations and operational intent is the Civil Affairs support team.

Joint Publication 3-57T, Doctrine for Joint Civil Affairs Operations, discusses the doctrinal integration and operation of civil affairs assets. Whether at the joint, operational or tactical levels, civil affairs assets have a qualitative effect on combat units performing post conflict operations. Civil affairs training and

integration prepares organizations to meet the complex array of non-traditional tasks. In addition, they add depth by establishing liaison between the military, governmental, and nongovernmental agencies supporting an operation. This knowledge of agencies assists in defining the operational level.¹¹ Another aspect of Civil Affairs doctrine addresses the law of war. Comprehension of the Law of Land Warfare is central when planning and training to rules of engagement.

Joint Publication 1-02, DoD Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms, defines rules of engagement as directives issued by a competent military authority which delineate the circumstances and limitations under which United States forces will initiate and/or continue combat engagement with other forces encountered.¹² Joint Publication 3-0 offers guidance to joint force commanders when developing rules of engagement and their relation to conflict termination and post conflict operations. It is the commander's knowledge of his strategic, operational and tactical environments that allows to anticipate potential constraints. Only through this understanding can he balance unit safety with the desire for restraint that comes with most post conflict operations.

Properly developed rules of engagement are clear and situationally tailored.¹³ In operations other than war, ROE are often restrictive, detailed, and sensitive to political concerns.¹⁴ The problem with contingency operations is the fluidity that magnifies this problem. Commanders at all levels will face situational dilemmas where the use of force may or may not be addressed by the rules of engagement. Often, it boils down to ROE training and individual soldier discipline.

As post conflict operations progress, the military instrument of national power typically gives way to civilian control. At some point, military forces will support other US and international agency efforts.¹⁵ The interagency environment is captured in Joint Publication 3-08, Interagency Coordination During Joint Operations. The transition from military to civilian or international control can take on several forms. These forms include transition to local governments or host nations after natural disasters, to a UN peacekeeping force, or through the UNHCR to an NGO in support of refugees.¹⁶ Recently developed joint tactics, techniques, and procedures apply just as well to tactical units executing post conflict transition operations.

U.S. Army post conflict doctrine is primarily discussed in Field Manual 100-5 (Operations), Draft Field Manual 100-20 (Operations Other Than War), Field Manual 71-100 (Division Operations, Initial Draft), Field Manual 41-10 (Civil Affairs Operations), and Field Manual 100-23 (Peace Operations). In addition, Field Manual 27-10, "The Law of Land Warfare," while not directed toward post conflict operations, does articulate applicable international laws and treatise.

Not unlike the joint doctrine, U.S. Army literature associates successful post conflict operations with detailed planning and organizational versatility.¹⁷ This planning includes adjusted rules of engagement, force protection measures, interagency and host nation considerations, and the transfer of authority between military units and civilian organizations.¹⁸ U.S. Army Field Manual 100-5, Operations, maintains that the primary focus of post conflict operations is stability. Units must make the mental transition from combat to restoring order. By enforcing some semblance of order, the other

elements of national power, coupled with international and interagency mechanisms can start the rebuilding process.

As stated above, rules of engagement play an important role in structuring the transition from conflict to peace. Another aspect is the importance of the laws of war. The law of war applies to cases of international armed conflict and to the forcible occupation of enemy territory. A declaration of war is not essential for the application of this body of law.¹⁹ International law, as taught to service members, is directed toward individuals versus units. Hence, there is a limited understanding of combat and post conflict command responsibilities.²⁰ According to international laws, military forces gain occupation responsibilities when the territorial occupants come under military authority. The occupation extends only to the territory where such authority has been established and can be exercised.²¹ This environment does predicate that brigade level commanders understand and plan for the significance of military operations on an indigenous populace.

The infantry brigade's mission is to close with the enemy by means of fire and maneuver to destroy or capture him, or to repel his assaults by fire, close combat, and counterattack.²² This statement from the pages of U.S. Army Field Manual 7-30, The Infantry Brigade, gets to the point of brigade combat operations. Not until recently did the guidance continue and extend into military operations executed after the cessation of hostilities. The discussion of maneuver brigade post conflict operations is limited to Field Manual 7-30 (The Infantry Brigade), Field Manual 71-123 (Tactics and Techniques For Combined Arms Heavy Forces: Armored Brigade, Battalion/Task Force, and Company Team), The Application of Peace Enforcement Operations at Brigade and

Battalion: Infantry School White Paper, and Training Circular 7-98-1 (Brigade and Battalion Operations Other Than War Training Support Package). As they should, these brigade level publications focus mainly on combat and warfighting skills. Up to this point in time, the U.S. Army's leadership did not feel it necessary to assimilate the post conflict coordination and training tasks seen at divisions and corps' down to the combat brigades. Just with the recent publication of U.S. Army Field Manual 7-30 do post conflict operations receive any discussion.

Commanders and brigade operations officers require certain means and measures that enable them to comprehend the post conflict environment. The dynamics of ROE, and coordination and transition requirements challenge the brigade's command and control systems. Although brigades are not well suited for extended post conflict operations, there are training and organizational means at the commanders disposal. The brigade infrastructure, although adequate for combat operations, requires combat support, service support and civil affairs augmentation when conducting post conflict operations. Part of this augmentation will normally consist of establishment of an S5 staff section and additional liaison personnel.²³ This emerging doctrine places post conflict operations in a broader sense and the role of brigades as growing.

One source of future brigade doctrine is an U.S. Army Infantry School's White Paper titled: A Concept for the Infantry of the Twenty-First Century in Combat Operations and Operations Other Than War. Autonomy and greater independence characterizes future combat brigade operations. As technology enhances tactical organization capabilities,

the brigade becomes the organization of choice for employment in operations other than war.²⁴ We see in the conditions for future conflict the commitment of tailored brigade-size formations. Brigades will become responsible for greater areas and required to regularly interface with Joint Task force and other theater headquarters.²⁵ Future doctrine and design models will support independent brigade operations; make forces tailorable, and expandable; and retain as much as possible the habitual relationships for training as well as for operations.²⁶

This section emphasized those joint and U.S. Army standards for post conflict operations. Most doctrine is directed at division and higher commands. This leaves the maneuver brigade commander little if any guidance when confronted with post conflict missions. The next section examines four operations and illustrates the critical training, organization, rules of engagement, and transition issues faced by those tactical level commanders.

CASE STUDY ANALYSIS

As previously defined, contingency forces rapidly form, deploy, and execute the "emergency" missions tasked by the National Command Authorities. The Cold War increased U.S. contingency force interventions in a variety of locations throughout the world. One common characteristic was the lack of or limited tactical level post conflict planning. These post conflict operations became deleterious. Ultimately the tactical level commanders incurred the responsibility for addressing those critical post conflict issues and using their best judgement.

This section examines four cases studies. The First two cases (Operations POWER PACK and JUST CAUSE) offer examples of tactical level organizations conducting post conflict operations without any prior notification or training. The last two cases (Operations PROVIDE COMFORT and UPHOLD DEMOCRACY) contrast by illustrating units that were preidentified and trained on post conflict tasks. In each case, the study highlights the lessons learned as they relate to training and preparation, organizational structure, rules of engagement, and transition operations.

OPERATION POWER PACK

In 1965, the United States Army was once again experiencing a doctrinal and organizational revolution. After surviving President Eisenhower's policies of "massive retaliation" and the resulting turmoil of the pentomic era, the Army now looked east toward the Soviet threat and Viet Nam.²⁷ President Kennedy's new concept of "flexible response" represented a changed ideology where the hallmark was not nuclear deterrence, but a balanced approach to world wide conflicts. Along with this strategy, the Army replaced the pentomic division with the ROAD (Reorganization Objectives Army Division).²⁸ This was the setting for the United States' intervention in the Dominican Republic in late April 1965. President Johnson ostensibly conducted Operation POWER PACK to protect American lives and property, while the real, but unstated, mission was to prevent another Cuba and to avoid a situation like Viet Nam.²⁹

Even though the Army had participated in operations other than war in Lebanon and Viet Nam, the doctrine did not address such operations.³⁰

In the early to mid 1960s, Special Forces units started making a name for themselves by conducting non-traditional or unconventional operations. It was felt that these "special forces" could meet the unconventional warfare requirements while the rest of the United States Army trained for a high intensity, armored battlefield. In addition, conventional forces failed in their interoperability with joint, combined or interagency components.³¹ Operation POWER PACK presented a unique situation for participating forces. Luckily the paratroopers and Marines deployed for Operation POWER PACK had a tradition of innovation and adaptability. This adaptability bred flexibility and common sense decisions among the U.S. combat forces facing the Dominican Republic civil war and its aftermath.³² Once the belligerents separated, the military leaders, starting with Lieutenant General Bruce Palmer (Commander, U.S. Forces Dominican Republic), recognized the new environment dictated both mental and physical changes. "Often the determinant of success or failure was simply the knack of knowing when to do something 'by the book' and when to throw the book away."³³

The situation that developed demonstrated the ambiguous nature of post conflict operations. Forces now simultaneously executed both their combat mission as well as rendering humanitarian support. This dynamic setting created confusion and caught many soldiers by surprise. Some of the troops resented this new mission; one 82d Airborne trooper was quoted as saying, "cleanup the streets, hell - we came here to fight."³⁴ Eventually they adjusted and accepted a professional view of the new mission requirements. Combat troops worked side by side with civilian and military experts in order to help restore the country's infrastructure. While Marines and U.S. Army troops dispensed food and

medicine, military engineers worked to restore power and water to Santo Domingo and to repair the city's incinerator so that garbage collection could resume. These dramatic changes to the U.S. Army's mission resulted in organizational changes as well.

Operation POWER PACK illustrated weaknesses in conventional force doctrine and an ignorance of the assets needed to support post conflict operations. Not since World War II had such a large contingent of civil affairs assets deployed in support of a contingency operation. Their integration and that of the other supporting governmental agencies posed a significant challenge at both the operational and tactical levels. Once combat operations ceased, General Palmer developed a civic action-civil affairs program that the Marines and paratroopers supported from their positions in and around Santo Domingo.

The 42d Civil Affairs Company became indispensable in the planning, administration, coordination, and implementation of this extensive civilian-military enterprise.³⁵ Civil affairs and special forces units increased conventional unit capabilities and range. In mid-May, U.S. Special Forces in Santo Domingo received new orders to assist the 82d Airborne Division's civic action programs. The ever evolving situation forced many military organizations to become more and more amorphous. However, problems still existed in the realm of use of force. The dilemma was that local fighting continued and the rules of engagement did not reflect this nebulous situation.

In the Dominican Republic, like many contingencies, the post conflict operations commenced prior to hostilities ending. This placed soldiers and leaders in a precarious position where every situation was handled independently, and the rules of engagement did not uniformly

apply. In addition, the situation shifted from a one of principally military domination to a political aim of US force neutrality. The paratroopers now faced a dilemma; up to this time, they had overtly supported the anti-communist elements and were now told to shift their mentality.³⁶ The ROE dictated from Washington, did not offer ground commanders many alternatives. As then Chief of Staff of the Army General Harold K. Johnson wrote, "one thing that must be remembered . . . is that the command of squads has now been transferred to Washington and is not necessarily limited to the Pentagon either."³⁷ Military leaders quickly realized that only disciplined, informed soldiers would succeed in this environment. Military action can stabilize conditions but cannot alone solve political problem, much less the basic social and economic inequities; indeed military efforts can make matters worse.³⁸ This phenomenon led to a U.S. strategy of transition away from U.S. military and toward a greater involvement of international peacekeeping forces.

One goal associated with recent contingency operations is to rectify or repair the emergency situation and then redeploy the military forces as soon as reasonably possible. With the pullout of military elements a void is created. In combat situations, this void is usually associated with the governmental and civil infrastructure. Many governmental and non-governmental agencies assist the post conflict rebuilding effort. Success for military forces is often defined by the manner in which responsibility is transitioned from the military to civilian agencies. Operation POWER PACK's post conflict operations required coordination between the military, U.S. agencies such as A.I.D., the Peace Corps, and other members of the Inter-American Peace

Force(IAPF).³⁹ Appendix B illustrates the members of the IAPF. The prevailing operational mind set was that combat forces could not and should not participate in nation building efforts.⁴⁰

What evolved was an emphasis on returning infrastructure support operations to international and private organizations as soon as possible. The Public Welfare Teams, working with A.I.D. officials and private agencies, initiated a massive civil relief food distribution program. Responsibility for food relief and economic aid programs was transferred to assistant secretary of state of economic affairs Anthony Solomon, who returned to the Dominican Republic in mid-May with a team of specialists.⁴¹ In Santo Domingo the IAPF assumed responsibility for emergency relief operations for a large segment of the city's population: distributing food and water providing medical care, and ensuring the uninterrupted operation of the city's utilities.⁴² This transition permitted the disengagement and redeployment of US forces.

Many lessons resulted from our participation in Operation POWER PACK. Operation JUST CAUSE illustrates the lessons at the operational and strategic planning levels. The problems encountered during JUST CAUSE revolve around conventional brigade capabilities and mission orientation.

OPERATION JUST CAUSE

Unlike Operation POWER PACK, JUST CAUSE planning began almost two years prior to its execution.⁴³ This allowed both operational and strategic planners to fully develop the end state requirements and to define mission success in terms of ways and means. The "means" consisted of primarily airborne, special operations, and light infantry

forces. The "ways" included a forced entry assault in support of President George Bush's stated end state objects of protecting American lives, ensuring the continued operation and neutrality of the Panama Canal, restoring democracy in Panama, and bringing General Manuel Noriega to justice.⁴⁴

On 5 August 1989, General Frederick F. Woerner relinquished command of United States Southern Command to General Maxwell R. Thurman.⁴⁵ Unfortunately, the Woerner/Thurman transition changed more than the operational concept. The U.S.SOUTHCOM staff who devised Woerner's post conflict plan had little if any say with General Thurman (CINCSOUTH) and Lieutenant General Stiner (XVIII Airborne Corps Commander). Consequently, the transition between Operations JUST CAUSE's combat and post conflict phases caught many units by surprise.

The combat units participating in Operation JUST CAUSE were some of U.S. Army's the most highly trained soldiers. Unfortunately, the skills in which these soldiers were best at did not compliment post conflict operations. Therefore, a pause resulted while the tactical level leadership reoriented its mission focus from combat to primarily stability and support of the new Panamanian government. 2d Brigade, 7th Infantry Division from Fort Ord California, played a key role in the post conflict phase of Operation JUST CAUSE. Upon notification, 2d Brigade deployed shortly after H-Hour and began operations in western Panama. 2d Brigade's primary objectives were to neutralize the PDF, secure key sites and facilities, protect US lives and property, restore law and order, and demonstrate support for the emerging Panamanian government.⁴⁶

U.S. Army Captain John Sieder didn't know it when he flew into Penonome on 22 December, but he was to about to run a city. As commander of B Company, 5th Battalion, 21st Infantry Regiment, Sieder became a guinea pig for 2d Brigade's new mission, which assumed the characteristically ordinary name "stability operations." Thus began a phase of Just Cause that turned out to be anything but ordinary for the thousands of infantrymen who had a part in it, including Sieder, who became a de facto mayor in the post-Noriega regime. Entering each city, town, and hamlet ready for a fight, the soldiers who carried out stability operations found themselves instead assigned to a variety of missions they had never dreamed of in training.⁴⁷ The Panamanian political and more importantly civil infrastructure was in a shambles. Not knowing their ultimate mission, 2d Brigade was unprepared in both a training and organizational sense for post conflict tasks.

With exception to a few special operations units, most conventional units basically "came as is" to Panama. The 82d Airborne Division and the 7th Infantry Division planning and rehearsals concentrated on their combat mission to the exclusion of any post conflict considerations. The units cannot be faulted with this, but it shows how little emphasis was placed on tailoring forces to meet the strategic/political end state. Physically, light infantry often experience difficulty with post conflict operations because they lacked the necessary ground transportation to support the stability and support requirements. Appendix C illustrates a Light Infantry Brigade organization. In addition, the mental transition from executing combat operations to stability or humanitarian is significant.

The most vexing problem facing the brigade was a lack of communications and transportation assets. Tactical Satellite radios, which are not an organic asset, were required due to the large brigade area of operations. In addition, the brigade arrived with only one quarter of its authorized vehicles which were essential for movement of supplies and personnel.⁴⁸ This critical transportation shortage caused an initial capability degradation. Ultimately in January, additional helicopters and trucks arrived to support the brigade's efforts through the countryside. The rapid transition from combat to peace operations not only caught the 7th Infantry Division off guard, it also forced the joint and national leadership to reevaluate the rules of engagement.

The soldiers and commanders participating in Operation JUST CAUSE experienced and reacted to frequent changes to the rules of engagement. The speed with which the operation progressed surprised many planners. This resulted in reactive versus proactive ROE changes. While the planners understood the surgical nature in which many of the combat operations occur, they did not anticipated the rapid situational changes. Hence, the abrupt cessation of hostilities produced an ROE void. Transitional ROE are essential in maintaining a balance between force protection and restraint. Had transitional ROE been established earlier, several unnecessary Panamanian deaths would have been avoided.

Operation JUST CAUSE differs from POWER PACK through the manner in which the military transitioned responsibility to civil authorities. In this case, there was no international peacekeeping force. The historical military presence in Panama predicated the U.S. government's maintenance of control over rebuilding the nation. Part of this was the U.S. policy position that the Panamanian government rapidly reestablish

civil control. To that end, the operational objectives included removing Noriega and establishing an interim government until a new Panamanian government could be established.⁴⁹ The advantage of an established head of state is the coordination effort between intergovernmental agencies and the fact that the U.S. military could disengage rapidly.

Panamanian reality differed from this utopian perspective. The newly established government of Panama consisted of only the presidency and vice presidencies. Neither cabinet nor civil-administrative positions had qualified bureaucrats. Filling these positions took time, and time was on the President Bush's mind. He did not want to keep forces in Panama any longer than absolutely necessary. Therefore, a dilemma developed with respect to the U.S. military presence in country and the Panamanian President's ability to govern effectively. The 7th Infantry Division's 2d Brigade and in-country assets conducted crucial support operations in the months after JUST CAUSE to assist in stabilizing the country's infrastructure and transitioning their efforts to U.S., Panamanian, and civil agencies. The ad hoc nature of the tactical response added to the problem with these transition efforts.

Early identification and training may have helped in recognizing the post conflict problem areas. Prior to Operation JUST CAUSE, U.S. Army company and field grade officers received little if any training on interagency coordination and what it takes to build unity of effort during post conflict operations.⁵⁰ Only recently, has instruction at the Army's Command and General Staff and War Colleges been focused on operations other than war and the interagency environment in which tactical units often operate.

The next case study examines the 3d Battalion, 325th Infantry's involvement in Operations PROVIDE COMFORT. Differences in this situation from the previous two revolve around the unit's preparatory training and organization, the environment in which operations occurred and finally the differences in transitioning support operations to an international agency.

OPERATION PROVIDE COMFORT

In late March 1991, the United Nations reported that as many as two thousand Kurds, mostly women and children, were dying each day in the Iraqi-Turkish border mountains.⁵¹ The Bush administration initially balked at U.S. involvement due to fears of committing a large regional military presence over a prolonged period of time. The administration changed its position as a result of two events: Secretary of State James Baker's situation report explaining the dire living conditions for the refugees and intense international and domestic pressure for the United States to take action.

On 5 April 1991, President George Bush ordered the Commander in Chief, European Command (USCINCEUR) to commence operations to aid the Kurdish refugees. Combined Task Force PROVIDE COMFORT formed on 17 April under Lieutenant General John Shalikashvili's command. Major General James Jamerson became the deputy CTF commander, Brigadier General Richard Potter assumed command of JTF Alpha and MG Jay Garner commanded JTF Bravo. JTF Alpha's primary focus was to establish contact with the refugees, provide immediate aid, and convince them to move out of the mountains to either their homes or the camps being established by JTF Bravo.⁵²

Task Force Bravo, of which the 3d Battalion, 325th Airborne Combat Team was a part, had the mission of resettling the Kurdish population. This resulted in surveying, securing, and constructing refugee camps within Iraq. Additionally, the task force commander, Major General Jay Garner possessed combat forces whose mission was to entice and if necessary force the Iraqi Army out of the Kurdish villages, allowing the Kurds to return. Coordination at the operational and tactical levels with United Nations' agencies and non-governmental organizations was essential to the successful transition of operational control.⁵³

Prior to Operation PROVIDE COMFORT, Lieutenant Colonel John Abizaid's battalion task force trained primarily on the close combat missions supporting Operations DESERT STORM.⁵⁴ This focus changed on 17 April 1991, when the battalion was alerted for a possible deployment to Iraq.⁵⁵ The preparations culminated on 25 April when the battalion moved from its base in Vicenza Italy to Zakho, Iraq.⁵⁶

3-325 Airborne Combat Team is not a normal airborne infantry battalion. Due to the nature of its mission in Southern Europe, the battalion is capable of long deployments and is virtually self sufficient. Physically, the battalion not only possesses its three infantry companies, but it also has an artillery battery, both heavy and light engineers, as well as a full compliment of combat support and service support assets. The battalion's command and control structure offers depth and allows it to conduct split operations. With the battalion commander, there is a deputy commander who is a senior field grade officer and capable of independent command. To compliment this unique organization, a robust staff organization exists to support the litany of joint and combined tasks assigned.

Because there was nearly a week between the warning order and the battalion's deployment, Abizaid spent the time training and tailoring his task force.⁵⁷ As the political, military, and international environments evolved, it became obvious that the battalion must change both mentally and physically. Although, the battalion's mission remained combat oriented, it mainly focused on deterrence versus overt force. This meant educating and equipping subordinates to meet this new challenge in a mature and systematic manner. The mission analysis resulted in a training and reorganization program.

The battalion training program introduced soldiers to security missions involving building road blocks and controlling traffic within a newly formed security zone. This task, which caused problems during Operation JUST CAUSE, was a key link between the soldier's physical and mental states. At platoon and squad levels, soldiers changed their mind-set from that of closing with and destroying the enemy to accomplishing the mission without resorting to force.⁵⁸

Another concern based on the vastness of the terrain was tactical mobility. Since the area of operations was large, rugged and very isolated and because allied aircraft were tied up delivering supplies, the battalion could not rely on external transportation. Colonel Abizaid, realizing that the mission called for organizing numerous road blocks, each with its own mobility, directed a reorganization to ensure 100% tactical mobility.⁵⁹ This multiplied the battalion's tactical flexibility.

Coming on the heels of Operation DESERT STORM, the rules of engagement had to be liberal enough in the event of combat with the Iraqi forces, but conservative enough to allow the Iraqi's to disengage.

The battalion moved with scouts well forward, infantry mounted on trucks and plenty of air cover. Rules of engagement gave commanders great flexibility to protect their troops. This did not mean, however, that the battalion could initiate contact, and it was also clear from Joint Task Force Bravo that the battalion was not to seek combat but force the enemy out of the sector through our threat of action.⁶⁰ Daily, soldiers at the checkpoints or on patrol confronted these complex situations. Once again, the ROE training conducted in Vicenza paid off. The ROE preparatory training gave the soldiers confidence, while at the same time earning them the respect of allies and adversaries alike.

LTG Shalikashvili's mission was to conduct multinational humanitarian operations to provide immediate relief to displaced Iraqi civilians until international relief agencies and private voluntary organizations assumed overall supervision.⁶¹ In essence, the battalion's mission was to create the conditions so that a seamless transition could occur between the combined task force and the principal United Nations agencies. Initially, there existed a mutual lack of understanding or confidence between the military and non-governmental organizations. Security for the refugees and coordination between the military forces and UN/NGOs posed the greatest challenges facing the Combined Task Force. Finally, on 5 June 1991, the COMBINED TASK FORCE PROVIDE COMFORT transferred operational control to the UNHCR who assumed overall responsibility for coordinating relief activities in Northern Iraq.

The next case study examines 2d Brigade, 10th Mountain Division's post conflict mission during Operation UPHOLD DEMOCRACY. The differences center around the initial understanding of the unit's

mission, information flow prior to deployment and the time given it to conduct post conflict training.

OPERATION UPHOLD DEMOCRACY

The defining characteristic separating Operation UPHOLD DEMOCRACY apart from previously discussed cases is its post conflict planning. The operational concept spanned five phases: predeployment and crisis action, deployment and combat operations, force build-up and initial civil military operations, civil military operations (continued) and redeployment.⁶² In addition, a distinction existed between those forces designated for the initial combat operations and those executing post conflict operations. The 82d Airborne Division and selected Special Operations Forces planned for the initial assaults into Haiti. Once the situation was sufficiently stabilized, the 10th Mountain Division who owned the bulk of the post conflict mission, would deploy two brigades to secure and stabilize the country in preparation for President Aristide's return. As is generally the case with contingency operations, changes occurred much faster than the military planners anticipated. With the Jimmy Carter-General Raoul Cedras agreement, Operation UPHOLD DEMOCRACY automatically transitioned into the post conflict phase.⁶³ This meant a much earlier than expected deployment order for 2d Brigade, 10th Mountain Division, still at Fort Drum New York.

Colonel James Dubik's 2d Brigade Combat Team's (BCT) mission included four elements. First he deployed and conducted contingency security operations to stabilize Haiti's Northern sector (AO Detroit) centering in Cap Haitien. Second, he relieved the Marine Forces and

secured the Cap Haitien sea and air ports. Third, the 2d BCT executed civil military operations throughout Area of Operations Detroit. Finally, Colonel Dubik organized and operated the brigade with the goal of transitioning its mission to a United Nation's composite force.⁶⁴

As early as 8 January 1994, XVIII Airborne Corps alerted the 10th Mountain Division for deployment to Haiti in support of Operation UPHOLD DEMOCRACY. The division formed Joint Task Force 190 with the mission of deploying multinational forces to conduct military operations pursuant to Chapter VII of the United Nations charter. This included maintaining a stable and secure the environment in which the legitimate government of Haiti, with the support of international organizations and agencies, could return to functional governance. The existence of these conditions resulted in the turn over of responsibility for ongoing operations to the government of Haiti or designated international organizations.⁶⁵

The mission's unique nature required that a certain amount of preparatory training. Colonel Dubik foresaw this and oriented his training plan to encompass the joint, combined, and interagency aspects of his operational environment. Appendix D illustrates the brigade training program. Immediately after notification, Colonel Dubik and his staff established a brigadetraining program involving individual, collective, and staff tasks. These tasks emerged from the staff's mission analysis of the Haitian situation and Somalia experiences. Situational training exercises, which incorporated each task, placed soldiers, leaders and staffs in a simulated operational environment.

Colonel Dubik believed he must maintain a stable environment to ensure successful completion of any civil-military projects.⁶⁶ In

addition, Dubik's headquarters was tied into tactical, operational and strategic intelligence sources, thus giving leaders the means to better orient their training programs. Water, medical, transportation, and to a lesser extent, fuel formed the most critical elements of support.⁶⁷ This resulted in the development of training scenarios where operations officers and logisticians solved problems requiring innovative solutions to unique support situations.

Colonel Dubik identified several areas as essential for the successful accomplishment of the brigade's civil-military operations. First, he must facilitate and enhance international and private volunteer organizations and government of Haiti operations within AO Detroit. Second, to accomplish this he had to conduct civil-military meetings and conferences with international organizations, private volunteer organization, and government of Haiti representatives. Third, he had to determine needs within his area and assess outlying population centers to identify civil-military projects. Finally, he had to execute the civil-military operations tasked from higher.⁶⁸ Colonel Dubik understood the needs of his operational environment. He also understood his own requirements for information. These two aspects led him to reorganize his staff to replicate its joint, combined and interagency environment. Part of this restructuring involved forming a Civil Military Operations Center from his Fire Support Element. Colonel Dubik knew that without some form or separate structure, he could not maintain control over the situation. The S5 was responsible for coordination responsibilities with the NGOs, Haitian government, and the CA Tactical Planning Team (CATPT) who controlled the CADST attached to the battalion.⁶⁹

The CMOC was constructed at Fort Drum prior to deployment. The model called for individual cells within the CMOC to handle matters concerning IOs, PVOs, and the GOH. Dubik felt that the combined efforts of all governmental and nongovernmental organizations created a synergy which significantly contributed to a sense of unity of effort toward establishing a secure and stable environment in Haiti.⁷⁰ This also led to better relations between military and nonmilitary organs during the transition from the U.S. to U.N. controlled operations.

After relieving the Marine Forces, 2d BCT's infantrymen moved out to control key sites in Cap Haitien, operated in the countryside, and provided a quick reaction force. Colonel Dubik's primary concerns were identifying and securing key fixed facilities, establishing patrols in Cap Haitien and within a 14,000 square kilometer area of northern Haiti, and restoring law and order by establishing an interim public security force and a local jail.⁷¹ The manpower-intensive disposition of stability operations demanded that the brigade adjust its command and control apparatus. Not only was the brigade spread throughout northern Haiti, it also was responsible for air, naval, combined and interagency realms within this area. As such, Colonel Dubik reorganized his headquarters reflecting operational environmental requirements of which the primary focus was on conducting civil military operations. Appendix E offers a diagram that illustrates the 2d BCT staff reorganization.

The ambivalent conditions (conflict to post conflict) in which Joint Task Forces 180 (XVIII Airborne Corps) and 190 (10th Mountain Division) operated required adjustable rules of engagement. Reflecting this paradox, three sets of ROE governed military engagements. The first set of ROE pertained to the initial entry period of hostility.

The second, and more restrictive set, dictated engagement criteria during transition to civil-military operations. The third set applied to the attack helicopters across the spectrum of hostilities, transition, and peacetime.⁷² Given the dynamic political situation unfolding on 19 September, the ROE gave commanders a responsive means for addressing the evolving environment. Within 18 hours of the initial landing, the ROE was changed to a peacetime.⁷³

Once again, time factored significantly as one compares Operation UPHOLD DEMOCRACY with the previous cases. Prior to Operation UPHOLD DEMOCRACY, the tactical units responsible for the initial entry and those for the post conflict phase rehearsed the rules of engagement. These rehearsals occurred in varying conditions in which junior leaders assimilated the ROE to the extent that it became second nature. Lieutenant Colonel Mark O'Neil, commander of 2d Battalion, 14th Infantry, put it succinctly when he said,

The conduct of ROE training was effective . . . We found that, even given the changes to the ROE once we arrived at Port-au-Prince, the soldiers had been given a workable, understandable set of rules to live by. Battalion and company commanders served as the primary instructors, a procedure that ensured consistent training and uniform understanding. Commanders, not lawyers, will give orders to soldiers in combat. For this reason, commanders must train their soldiers on the rules of engagement, in language that soldiers, who are not lawyers, can understand.⁷⁴

Transitioning the brigade's support for Operation UPHOLD DEMOCRACY signified completing a complex array of actions. The mission's personality connoted transitioning with not one but several military and civil agencies. The operating principle for all phases was to ensure that all aspects of the brigade's operations could be "sold off." Selling Off the business occurred only when, at each level and for each mission, the UN, private, or GOH agencies could accomplish the mission

without a degradation in quality. Early and frequent coordination with the United Nations Mission in Haiti (UNMIH) representatives promoted unity of effort between the Joint Task Force 180 and United Nations forces.

Colonel Dubik realized from the beginning that his transition strategy would determine his mission success. A variety of private, governmental, and international organizations participated in rebuilding Haiti. The brigade CMOC produced an early dialog with these agencies and insured that when required they could receive the mission. As it turned out, the transition was easier than initially anticipated. The introduction of the 25th Infantry division's, 2d Brigade allowed Colonel Dubik to execute a relief in place in much the same manner he did with the Marines. On 4 January 1995, the Multinational Force declared Haiti to be secure and stable. U.S. Atlantic Command confirmed that assessment, thus laying the groundwork for transition to the United Nations Mission in Haiti (UNMIH) by the 31st of March, 1995.

The 2d Brigade Combat Team demonstrated the broad capabilities the brigade can exercise when resourced with training time, qualified personnel, and general guidance. The primary advantage Colonel Dubik's brigade had over units participating in Operations POWER PACK, JUST CAUSE, and PROVIDE COMFORT is that it could prepare, therefore, its commanders and planners could focus on executing the post conflict mission. The next section offers conclusions and recommendations to the post conflict operations dilemma faced by tactical combat commanders.

CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS.

The question originally asked as the basis for this study was are combat brigades who participate in contingency deployments prepared for post conflict operations. This study demonstrated that until 1994 the answer was a resounding no. There are a variety of causes for this. Post conflict operations are dynamic, in that there is rarely a consistent pattern or set of associated conditions that allow units to establish common policies and procedures. In addition, post conflict operations force units to function as complex adaptive systems, able to rapidly adjust to environmental requirements.⁷⁵ This environment may range from war to peace and involve military, interagency, international, and non-government participants. Brigade commanders and planners may or may not know the end state requirements, understand the ways in which their military command is going to address the environment, or possess the means for executing post conflict operations. In most cases, contingency forces are neither trained nor organized to meet post conflict challenges. In conclusion, the monograph addresses the reasons why units tend to perform poorly during post conflict operations. In addition, the monograph offers recommendations for brigade commanders in terms of training, organization, rules of engagement, and transition.

In Military Misfortunes: The Anatomy of Failure in War, Eliot A. Cohen and John Gooch offer a didactic discussion of failure in military units. They postulate that three forms of failure exist. First is a failure to "learn readily accessible lessons from other's experiences."⁷⁶ Second is a failure to anticipate. That is, a failure to take reasonable precautions against a known hazard, condition, or

outcome.⁷⁷ The final failure category Cohen and Gooch discuss is the failure to *adapt* to unexpected circumstances.⁷⁸

What is seen in Operation POWER PACK is the failure to learn at the strategic, operational, and tactical levels. The Dominican Republic incursion was not the first time contingency forces deployed to conduct combat operations and ended up supporting a post conflict scenario. U.S. combat brigades supported both combat and post conflict missions during Operation BLUE BAT, in Lebanon.⁷⁹ Conversely, Operation JUST CAUSE did learn from Operations like POWER PACK and URGENT FURY and demonstrated significant post conflict planning at the strategic and operational levels. Unfortunately, as a result of communications failures between the Woerner planners and the Thurman/Stiner operators, this did not translate to the tactical level.

Lieutenant Colonel Abizaid's battalion and Colonel Dubik's brigade learned as they incorporated changes to their training regimen and organizational structure. One lesson learned related to those elements influencing the battlefield architecture. Many governmental and nongovernmental organizations operate within the conflict areas and maintain offices within the United States. For Lieutenant Colonel Abizaid, the U.S. Army Special Forces units offered him the best combat and relief situation information.⁸⁰ Colonel Dubik, as part of XVIII Airborne Corps, received information from a variety of interagency sources that painted the social, economic, political, and military pictures. Contact with these organizations provides environmental, cultural, and situational awareness.

In a manner similar to failing to learn, Operations POWER PACK and JUST CAUSE illustrated a failure to anticipate post conflict

requirements. In both cases, this enigmatic situation occurred at both operational and tactical levels. Lacking trained civil affairs personnel, commanders employed combat troops to accomplish the relief and infrastructure revitalization tasks.

In March 1988, the SOUTHCOM Commander in Chief, General Woerner directed that an additional restoration planning/operations phase be included into the ELABORATE MAZE operation order.⁸¹ SOUTHCOM's J-5 Civil Affairs Branch was primarily charged with planning and then executing as the Civil Military Operations Task Force (CMOTF) the JUST CAUSE post conflict phase.⁸²

The move to General Thurman's reign and subsequent planning changes emphasized combat operations to the exclusion of post conflict operations.⁸³ "The importance of the lack of effective coordination of planning for post conflict civil military operations would be reflected in the poor coordination on execution between the commander, Civil Military Operations Task Force and Joint Task Force South, the embassy, and other US government civilian agencies."⁸⁴

What General Thurman and Lieutenant General Stiner did not anticipate was the massive looting and destruction of downtown Panama City. This failure resulted in the stop-gap action of deploying 2d Brigade, 7th Infantry Division to stabilize the area.⁸⁵ Anticipation failures and the resulting quick fixes often created more complications. Tactical units experienced difficulty bridging the mental gap between combat and stability operations. Units deploying into "combat" situations often overwhelmed the local population.

Colonel Abizaid anticipated the need for broad area control measures. Therefore, he reorganized his battalion into platoon

checkpoints. By anticipating this requirement, Abizaïd reorganized his unit and trained his soldiers on specific environmental requirements. The same can be said for Colonel Dubik's brigade. Dubik realized that a large measure of his success would entail coordinating the efforts of governmental, non-governmental, and interagency organizations operating in Cap Haitien. Hence, he reorganized his Fire Support Element into a Civil Military Operations Center (CMOC). Dubik staffed and trained the CMOC prior to deployment which resulted in little or no time before CMO operations began in AO DETROIT.

All four case studies are considered successes in military terms. This is largely due to the armed forces ability to adapt to complex situations. At the tactical level, the troops in the Dominican Republic enjoyed a celebrity status and performed magnificently those tasks for which they were not trained.

When problems developed, flexibility and adaptability became as critical as training and discipline to those trying to devise solutions. Often the determinant of success or failure was simply the knack of knowing when to do something "by the book" and when to throw the book away.⁸⁶

The same is true for the 7th Infantry Division in Panama. Once the leadership understood the mission's nature, they prepared their forces, both mentally and physically, for the tasks at hand. Units reorganized and received the tactical transportation required to move supplies and personnel throughout Panama. The latter case studies show how, with little time, units can easily adapt to post conflict operations.

It is not important to just recount these events, but to understand the lessons and how they apply to future brigade operations. The study's last pages address these lessons in terms of training, organization, rules of engagement, and transition.

The Army training mission is to prepare soldiers, leaders, and units to deploy, fight, and win in combat at any intensity level, anywhere, anytime. Today's environment sees more commanders fighting for training resources to just meet mission essential task requirements. Therefore, post conflict tasks fare poorly on the unit training schedule. The realization this study surfaces is a misperception between what our strategic and operational planners see as tactical unit missions and the tasks that are emphasized by these combat units. Are we really "training as we fight" or are we limited to "training for the fight?" Post conflict preparatory training is best discussed in terms of individual, unit, and staff tasks.

Stability operations constitute the majority of what a combat brigade normally accomplish during the post conflict phase. At the individual soldier level, the critical tasks include rules of engagement, civil disturbance/crowd control, and cultural briefs.

Success depends more than anything else on vigilance and mental alertness of the most junior soldier and his non-commissioned leader for it is on their reaction and immediate response that the success of the operation rests.⁸⁷

2d Brigade, 10th Mountain Division illustrated a unique case relating to preparatory training. Most units will not know in advance the specific rules of engagement pertaining to a specific operation. But, there are general trends or forms in which ROE are applied. Situational training exercises offer the best means for training these tasks. Units can easily recreate situations discussed in the Somalia, Rwanda, and Haiti after action reports. This training has two benefits. First, soldiers gain confidence in situations requiring greater discipline and personal interaction with a host nation populace. Second, by introducing

soldiers to different ROE levels, they are able to better anticipate the changes and adjust faster when these changes do occur.

Closely related to ROE training is civil disturbance/crowd control techniques. As seen in the Dominican Republic, the 82d soldiers escorting relief supplies often encountered crowds at distribution sites. Relief agencies expect the military to maintain control. Recent examples in Somalia, illustrate the usefulness of "non-lethal techniques." Training soldiers in the use of lethal and non-lethal force brings maturity and knowledge to these complex situations. The soldiers' "tool bag" must consist of an array of coercive techniques such as verbal persuasion, police support, or other non-lethal techniques. In addition, they must also be capable of assessing situations and realizing when it is best to withdraw from a scene over which they have control.

Finally, soldiers must respect the people's customs and social mores. Building an awareness not only of traditions, but also an understanding of traditional enemies assists them in recognizing riotous situations and quickly defusing them. During Operation POWER PACK, in day-to-day dealings with Dominican citizens, a racial slur or and ugly incident could undo a great deal of good will in seconds.⁸⁸ Soldiers just need to understand basic customs, be disciplined, and respect a people's basic human rights. While individual soldiers constitute the first line of contact between the military and people, squads and platoons are the building blocks for a coherent post conflict strategy. Coupled with their primary stability mission is the secondary effect that they are representatives of the joint or combined command.

Control points, also commonly referred to as check points, are a common means of controlling areas of operations. As demonstrated in Iraq, the check points were multi-functional. First, they offered a secure route by which refugees could move to established relief sites. Second, they controlled the militant Kurds who were fighting the Iraqi Army. Finally, the "Flying Checkpoints" constituted an offensive means for removing Iraqi Army elements from designated relief sites.⁸⁹ In Vicenza, Italy and at Fort Drum, soldiers deploying for Operations PROVIDE COMFORT and UPHOLD DEMOCRACY replicated the environment and acquainted units with the conditions in which they could expect to operate. The key to success is flexibility. No two sectors are alike and leaders must adapt the skills developed during training to the specific situation.

During post conflict operations, it is possible that brigade staffs operate at all levels of command. They may coordinate the actions of joint, combined, coalition, and civilian components who operate both within and outside unit boundaries.⁹⁰ Information flow is crucial to success. A trained staff differentiates between critical information and "battlefield noise." Methods of displaying this information help not only the commander but other staff members through synergy and synchronization. The joint, combined and interagency environment stresses the tactical operations center interoperability systems. Those communications systems, whose primary purpose is battle tracking, must also maintain information to flow between the unit and its external agencies. When this is done staffs understand their responsibilities and are better prepared to support host nation, international, and interagency requests.

The current combat brigade design lacks the flexibility required for future combat and post combat operations. Future post conflict operations may dictate an interface between combat brigades and their joint command structure, interagency participants, and possibly international private voluntary organizations. The current brigade force structure requires additional means to promote interoperability and communication between itself and its external environment.

Earlier I stated that the staff must comprehend its environment. Part and parcel with this comprehension is organization. If the brigade staff is the central means of communication between the military and external agencies, then it must transform as necessary to promote interoperability. By reorganizing his Fire Support Element into a CMOC, Colonel Dubik was aware of the limited use of artillery for his mission and the infinitely greater need for an interoperability mechanism between the brigade and its environment.

Endemic to this complex combat and post conflict environment is the need for flexible rules of engagement. The key characteristic accompanying post conflict operations is the relation of international law and the concept of occupation.

All commanders are under legal obligations imposed by international law, including the Geneva Convention of 1949, to provide a minimum standard of humane care and treatment for all civilians, to establish law and order, and to protect private property in their geographic area of responsibility.⁹¹

During Operation POWER PACK, U.S. forces initially failed to meet their international legal obligations. The contemporary mentality as summed up by Lieutenant General Bruce Palmer was, "Intervening forces should get in and get out as soon as possible. Stability operations of this (Operation POWER PACK) nature are, in a sense, dead-end situations. The

longer forces stay, the worse things are likely to become."⁹² This is endemic of contingency operations where the desired end state includes the rapid entry and withdrawal of combat forces. Unfortunately this almost never happens. The result is commanders and staffs fail to anticipate and plan sequels that include operations between the combat phase and redeployment. Commanders and staffs must continue to train on the rules of war and their application to the tactical employment of forces and the unit's post conflict responsibility.

Rarely will the United States keep forces deployed any longer than absolutely necessary. Therefore, both military and civilian policy makers concurrently establish the criteria, systems, and means for transition. Operational control often transitions to either a host nation government, an international peacekeeping force, or a United Nations and private relief organizations. Anticipation is essential in promoting a smooth transition. The question that military planners must ask themselves is when the military pulls out, will civil or governmental control of stability operations continue without substantial degradation? Successful transitions require detailed coordination. If at all possible transition coordination should start prior to deployment. Operational security measures often make this impossible. If OPSEC considerations prevent prior coordination, then it is incumbent upon the unit to identify and contact those organizations as soon as it finds itself responsible for post conflict operations.

From Operation POWER PACK through PROVIDE COMFORT to UPHOLD DEMOCRACY, tactical commanders addressed complex situations that often bordered between conflict and peace. With respect to the four areas of training, structure, rules of engagement, and transition each operation

illustrated unique and challenging differences. As previously shown, most emergency situations see units coming in an "as is" state. What eventually develops is an awareness by these units of a need to receive augmentation and reorganization of staffs. In the same vein, the structure of most brigade combat teams is tailored only for the combat mission. A common thread throughout the four cases was the difficulty tactical commanders had anticipating and adjusting to changes in the rules of engagement. This phenomenon reflected the complexity in which tactical commanders must display the agility to move from conflict to peace in a matter of hours. This failure to recommend timely ROE amendments resulted national level agencies changing the ROE. In many cases, these ROE were so inflexible that they were often at odds with rational military practice.⁹³ This all adds up to a distinction between training for combat and training for war. The former constitutes one aspect of the latter. Our soldiers, leaders and units must be prepared for the peace after the conflict.

Appendix A: Key Terminology.

One primary goal within this study is to understand the terms commonly associated with post conflict operations. These terms come from both joint and U.S. Army doctrine. Listed below are several affiliated terms that require definition and a common understanding.

The study examines how the United States trains, organizes, and deploys its "rapid-deployment forces" and how these units react to the realities of post-conflict operations. Contingency forces are those units that react to what Joint Publication 1-02 defines as,

Emergencies involving military forces caused by natural disasters, terrorists, subversives, or by required military operations. Due to the uncertainty of the situation, contingencies require plans, rapid response, and special procedures to ensure the safety and readiness of personnel, installations, and equipment.

Draft U.S. Army Field Manual 101-5-1 (Operational Terms and Graphics) defines post conflict operations as those operations other than war which are conducted in the period following conflict termination. For this study, post conflict operations is defined as those tasks, missions, or operations conducted in support of conflict termination or after conflict termination that combat, combat support, and combat service support units execute as part of the governmental strategy to promote stability and/or transition life support and economic functions to governmental, non-governmental, and international agencies.⁹⁴

Post conflict activities. Those operations other than war that are conducted in the period following conflict and the cessation of active combat; activities focused on restoring order and minimizing confusion following the operation, reestablishing host nation infrastructure,

preparing forces for redeployment, and continuing presence to allow other elements of national power to achieve overall strategic aims.⁹⁵


Peace Building consists of Post conflict actions, primarily diplomatic, that strengthen and rebuild civil infrastructures and institutions in order to avoid a return to conflict. It also includes mechanisms that advance a sense of confidence and well-being and support economic reconstruction. Military as well as civilian involvement is normally required. Peace building activities included restoring civil authority, rebuilding physical infrastructure, and reestablishing commerce, schools, and medical facilities.⁹⁶

Rules of Engagement. In peace operations, well-crafted ROE can make the difference between success and failure. ROE are directives that delineate the circumstances and limitations under which US forces initiate and/or continue engagement with belligerent forces.⁹⁷

Force Tailoring. Planning for peace operations the commander must tailor a force suitable for the mission. It should be based on a unit's ability to contribute to achieving national interests and objectives and perceptions of the indigenous population, the international community, and the American public.⁹⁸

Civil-military Operations. The complex of activities in support of military operations embracing the interaction between the military force and civilian authorities fostering the development of favorable emotions, attitudes, and behavior in neutral, friendly, or hostile groups.⁹⁹

Appendix B. Operation POWER PACK Inter-American Peace Force Organization.



Appendix C. Light Infantry Brigade Organization.

Figures one and two below depict a normal peace-time and combat light infantry brigade organization. Due to Air Force limitations, 2d Brigade 7th Infantry Division was unable to deploy with its full complement of vehicles. In addition, many vehicles have long range radios permanently installed. These two aspects limited the brigade's ability to transport supplies and communicate effectively.

Figure 1





Figure 2



Appendix D. 2d Brigade Combat Team Preparatory Training.

1. 2d BCT's preparatory training was broken down into three situational training exercises. The first situational training exercise required the staff to plan and execute a relief in place, base support operations, casualty evacuation and security planning. The second exercise tested the brigade staff's ability to establish both air and sea ports and lodgements. In addition, this exercise forced the brigade staff to analyze infrastructure management and maintenance requirements. This ensured the deployment of the proper mix of combat, combat support and combat service support assets. The third brigade level situational training exercise focused on civil-military and stability operations. Colonel Dubik believed he must maintain a stable environment to ensure successful completion of any civil-military projects. Outlined below are the key aspects of each situational training exercise.

2. Situational Training Exercise #1: Main focus was Military Operations in Urban Terrain.

Squad

Defend MOUT
Clear Building
Move Tactically
Breach Obstacles
Overwatch/Spt by fire
Search Building

Platoon

Prep for Combat
Occupy AA
Sustain
Overwatch/Spt by fire
Mounted Convoy
Employ Sniper
Defend MOUT
Clear Building
OPSEC
Consolidate/Reorganize

Company

Prep for Combat
Occupy AA
OPSEC
CSS Operations
Process EPW
Mntd road march

Battalion

Staff Tasks
Consolidate/Reorganize
Conduct HMO
Conduct Media Ops

Brigade

Staff Tasks
Brigade Support Operations
Casualty Evacuation
Staffex: None Combatant Evacuation

Individual

Weapons Zero
AO Briefs
ROE
Culture
Medical
Law of War

leader

Battle Staff
Casualty Evacuation
ROE
Command and Control
Command Post Operations
Civil Disturbance

3. Situational Training Exercise #2. Main Focus Search and Attack.

Squad

Perform Helo Mvmt
Occupy AA
Move tactically
Link Up
Overwatch/Spt by fire
Ambush
Convoy/Mntd Security

Platoon

Prep for Combat
Consolidate/Reorganize
Sustain
Air Resupply
Helo Movement
Overwatch/Spt by fire
Move Tactically
Link Up
OPSEC
Zone Recon
Convoy/Mntd Security

Company

Prep for Combat
Occupy AA
Maintain OPSEC
Consolidate/Reorganize
Process EPW
Employ Fire Support
Move Tactically
Link Up
Perform Raid
Perform Air Assault

Battalion

Battle Staff Tasks
Consolidate/Reorganize
Conduct Air Assault
Perform Recon
Maintain Security

Brigade

Battle Staff Tasks
STAFFEX: Air/Sea Movement, Lodgement

Individual

First Aid
Perform Mvmt Tech
Report Enemy Info

Leader

Battle Staff
Casualty Evacuation
ROE
Preventive Medicine
Field Sanitation


4. Situational Training Exercise #3. Main focus on perimeter defense.

<u>Squad</u>	<u>Platoon</u>	<u>Company</u>
Defend MOUT	Prep for Combat	Prep for Combat
Occupy AA	Occupy AA	CSS Operations
Move Tactically	Sustain	Maintain OPSEC
Establish Blocks/ checkpoints	Conduct tactical road march	Relief in Place
Search Vehicle/building	Defend MOUT	Process EPW
	Est Road Block/ Checkpoints	Defend
	Move Tactically	Est. Road Block/ Checkpoints
	Civil Disturbance	Convoy/Mntd Security
	OPSEC	
	Occupy OP	
	Convoy and Mntd Security	

<u>Battalion</u>	<u>Brigade</u>
Battle Staff Task	Battle Staff Task
Consolidate/Reorganize	STAFFEX: Civil/military Ops
Defend	Stability Ops
Humanitarian Assistance	RSOP
Media Ops	Operate BSA/Casualty Evacuation
Relief in Place	

<u>Individual</u>	<u>Leader</u>
First Aid	Battle Staff Tasks
Select/prepare fighting position	Casualty Evacuation
Report Enemy Info	ROE
Law of Land Warfare	Preventative Medicine
Individual Movement Tech	Field Sanitation
	Command and Control

Appendix E. Diagram illustrating the 2d BCT staff reorganization and unit task organization.



MOC- MILITARY OPERATIONS CENTER
 PIC- PERSONNEL AND INFORMATION CENTER
 RIC - REGIONAL INTELLIGENCE CENTER
 RLOC- RESOURCE AND LOGISTICS OPERATIONS CENTER
 CMOC- CIVIL/MILITARY OPERATIONS CENTER

2d Brigade Combat Team Task Organization

<u>TF 2-87</u>	<u>CARICOM</u>	<u>TM AVN</u>	<u>IPSF/IPM</u>	<u>BCT CONTROL</u>
2-87IN	CARICOM BN	1XUH60	ARGENTINA IPM	HHC, 2D BRIGADE
2/B/41 EN	A CO	1XOH58	US IPM	MIL OPS CTR(TOC)
PLT 511 MP(-)	B CO	POL SEC	CARICOM IPM	REGIONAL INTEL CTR
TPT	HQ CO	AVUM	IPSF	CIV-MIL-OPS CTR
SEN TM	CST			CADST
CI TM				CI/IPW
LINGUISTS				TPT
G-CON				NODE PLT/10SIG
CA PLT				210 FSB (-)
MP PLTX2				AIR MEDEVAC
MED PLT				LINGUISTS
				SQD/2/511 MP

End Notes

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²⁶*Ibid.*, 6.

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³³*Ibid.*, 98.

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³⁵*Ibid.*, 134.

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